

of IE. In this sense, it will be seen how my account differs from the forest of forms to be found in the otherwise prudent balance drawn by Frisk, GEW 1.321.

**gónu* > Skt. *jānu*, Nuristani **zān-ʔ*), Pehl. *zānūk*, Gk. *γόνυ*, Arm. *cunr*, (Hitt. *genu* unoriginal);

gñuós etc. > (Gk. *γονός*), Hitt. *ganut*, Lat. *genui*;

gñu # ... > Av. *žnubyō*, Gk. *γνύξ* (?), *γνυί* (see fn. 6 above);

gñeu > Gk. *γνύξ* (?), Goth. *kniu* (derived);

gónue etc. > Gk. *γοῦνα*, Arm. *cung-kʰ*, Toch. A *kanwem*, B *kenīne*;

gñu- (cpd.) > Skt. *jñu-bddh-*, *abhi-jñu-*, Av. *fra-šnu-*, Gk. *γνύ-πετοι*, *ἰγνύη*, Goth. *knussjan* etc.;

gñu-n- (deriv. stem) > Gk. *γόνυατος* (< **γονῦγ-*), (dissimilated⁸)
Alb. Geg *gjū(-ni)* Tosk *glū(-ri)*, OIr. *glún*, Welsh *glin* (with unexplained **ū* in Celtic).

From the ancestors of such forms as these, then, in the separate dialects other commonly attested parts of the descendant paradigms came into being by extension and generalization: Gk. *γόνυατα*, Arm. *cung-* (note that Greek and Armenian seem to have generalized **gón-* in common), Lat. *genū*, the entire Germanic derivative **knewa-*, and of course the revocalized Hittite stem noted above. Only Balto-Slavic has rejected the stem entirely, probably through a clash with homophones of the shapes **žan-*, *žin-*.

Some Attic Kinship Terms

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1. ἀνεψιός

It has been asserted that in classical Greek kinship terminology ἀνεψιός “varies between cousin-german and nephew”¹⁾, but there is no evidence that the word can mean nephew. If one examines all the occurrences of this word in the orators, he will see that where the context permits us to determine its meaning, ἀνεψιός always means cousin, never nephew. So also in the dramatists and Thucydides. In all certain instances except one it means first cousin, the son of

⁷⁾ Kati *jā/zā*, Waigali and Ashkun *zā*; the timbre *a*, and not *o* or *u*, assures us that the vocalism was **ā* and not **ǎ*.

⁸⁾ See my discussion KZ 76.275ff., 1960.

¹⁾ M. Miller, JHS 73, 1953, 46.

Ego's paternal or maternal aunt or uncle. The one exception occurs in [Demosthenes] 43, where *ἀνεπιός* has an additional meaning: first cousin once removed²). Philagros is called *ἀνεπιός* to Hagnias, and he is the first cousin of Hagnias' father. The speaker does not say what relationship Hagnias is to Philagros³).

As for non-Attic authors one sometimes encounters the view that Herodotus uses the word to mean nephew. LSJ⁴ cites 7.5 as an example, but this is clearly in error⁴): *Μαρδόνιος ὁ Γωβρονέω, ὃς ἦν Ἐρέξη μὲν ἀνεπιός, Δαρείου δὲ ἀδελφεῆς παῖς*. Here Mardonios is Xerxes' first cousin, the son of Xerxes' aunt. The same relationship is described at 7.82. At 9.10.2 Pausanias is called the *ἀνεπιός* of Pleistarchos, the son of Leonidas, and further described as the son of Kleombrotos; at 5.41.3 we learn that Kleombrotos and Leonidas were brothers. In the other two Herodotean examples we cannot be sure of the relationship. Megabates is the *ἀνεπιός* of Artaphernes and Darius (5.32), but that is all we know of him. At 5.30.2 Aristagoras is called the *γαμβρός* and *ἀνεπιός* of Histiaios. Some say that Aristagoras is Histiaios' nephew⁵), but cousin is perfectly acceptable in this context: if *γαμβρός* means brother-in-law, one of the two tyrants married his own first cousin; if it means son-in-law, Aristagoras married his cousin's daughter⁶). Both types of marriage were normal in Greek society⁷).

2. *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες*

The correct interpretation of this term, once suggested by Sir John Miles⁸), is in danger of being lost. The Athenian inheritance

²) 41 and 49. While Thalheim's emendation of the first passage, making *ἀνεπιός* refer to Euboulides instead of Philagros, is attractive, there is no reason for altering the second.

³) Greek, like French and German, makes a distinction which English does not. A first cousin once removed may be either a *Vetter meiner Eltern* or a *Kind meines Veters*. In Attic the latter is normally *ἀνεπιδοῦς*. For the Latin terminology cf. J. André, *Rev. Phil.* 42, 1968, 42ff.

⁴) LSJ⁹ does not include nephew as a definition of *ἀνεπιός*.

⁵) A. de Sélincourt in his translation of Herodotus and Mabel Lang, *Historia* 17, 1968, 26.

⁶) For the meaning of *γαμβρός* in Herodotus cf. J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus*. s.v.

⁷) Cf. W. E. Thompson, *Phoenix* 21, 1967, 273ff. Note also Lysias 13.1, *κηδεστής γάρ μοι ἦν Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ἀνεπιός*, where there is no reason to doubt that *ἀνεπιός* has its usual meaning, and Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 11.28, *hic illius frater patruelis et socer, T. Torquatus*.

⁸) *Hermathena* 75, 1950, 69ff.

law, presumably dating back to Solon, provides that paternal relatives of the deceased shall inherit *μέχρι ἀνεπιῶν παίδων*⁹). In the latest treatment Molly Broadbent simply assumes without discussion that this term signifies the sons of the deceased's first cousins, i. e., his first cousins once removed¹⁰). But this is (or should be) out of the question. The Athenian courts ruled at least twice that the estate of Hagnias should go to his second cousin Theopompos¹¹), and in Isaios 11 Theopompos several times claims to be the *ἀνεπιῶ παῖς* of Hagnias¹²). A. R. W. Harrison in his recent definitive work on *The Law of Athens* recognizes that *ἀνεπιῶ παῖς* must in some way mean second cousin and accordingly suggests that in this phrase *ἀνεπιῶ* means first cousin once removed, relying on the usage of [Demosthenes] quoted above¹³). This is possible but less likely than Miles' view that *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες* are sons of first cousins and thus second cousins. The closest we come in Theopompos' speech to a definition of *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες*, that is, the ultimate class of relatives entitled to inherit, is section 8: *ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ Ἄγνιας, ὃ ἄνδρες, καὶ Εὐβουλίδης καὶ Στρατοκλήης καὶ Στρατιός ὁ τῆς Ἄγνίου μητρὸς ἀδελφὸς ἐξ ἀνεπιῶν ἐσμεν γεγονότες· καὶ γὰρ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἦσαν ἀνεπιῶι ἐκ πατραδέλφων.* (Cf. section 5, where *ἐξ ἀνεπιῶ* = *ἀνεπιῶ παῖς*.) These people are all second cousins, sons of first cousins. As Theopompos adds (10), all except the deceased were equally entitled to inherit during their lifetime. The term in question originates in a conception of a family derived from a common ancestor. The sons of this ancestor are brothers, the sons of brothers are cousins, and the sons of cousins, such as Hagnias and Theopompos, are *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες*. The trouble arises when Theopompos wishes to say, "I am Hagnias' second cousin." Although it might be more proper legalistically

⁹) [Demosthenes] 43.51; Isaios 7.22 and 11.2. Although the laws of Athens were recodified at the end of the fifth century, the wording of the inheritance law is probably archaic.

¹⁰) *Studies in Greek Genealogy*, 73ff.

¹¹) He had won the estate prior to the trial at which he delivered Isaios 11, and he must have been successful in that case since his son had control of Hagnias' property some years later, when [Demosthenes] 43 was delivered. If Theopompos and Hagnias were not *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες*, it would have been a simple matter for the speaker of [Demosthenes] 43 to prove it, and by doing so he would have destroyed his opponent's claim to the estate.

¹²) 10, where he specifically claims to be *πρὸς πατρός ἀνεπιῶ παῖς*, 11, 18 (if the customary emendation is correct), 29.

¹³) 143ff.; cf. CR 61, 1947, 41ff.

to say *ἀνεπιῶν παῖς*¹⁴), the natural way of saying it, I submit, is *ἀνεπιῶ παῖς*¹⁵).

Once in the speech (12) Theopompos equates *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες* with *ἀνεπιδοῖ*, a usage supported by Pollux¹⁶). Of course, we would expect that *ἀνεπιδοῦς* could also mean son of one's cousin, i. e., one's first cousin once removed, and this is how Isaios and Demosthenes normally use the word¹⁷). On the other hand, the speaker of

¹⁴) Cf. Isaios 4.23, *ἀνεπιός ὄν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατραδέλφων*.

¹⁵) Likewise in section 5 *ἐξ ἀνεπιῶ* seems more natural than *ἐξ ἀνεπιῶν*. The other evidence for the meaning of *ἀνεπιῶν παῖδες* is indecisive. At [Demosthenes] 43.57 and Plato, *Leges* 766C, 877D, and 878D the context does not determine its meaning. Some scholars, however, (including E. B. England, *The Laws of Plato* I, 589; William Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus*, 567f.; and Louis Gernet in the *Budé Plato* 11.1, CLII ff.) try to use the comparative method on the assumption that Plato consistently employs the same group of kinsmen (*ἀγχιστεία*) to perform all family functions. There are in fact two instances where he assigns duties to kin up and including first cousins once removed (925A and 929B, although the latter is very doubtful), but in each case he assigns the same duties to a second group. Instead of recognizing only one group of kinsmen and allotting all functions to it, it seems more likely that Plato for the most part simply follows contemporary Athenian practice in assigning various duties to various groups. But even if he does have a single group in mind, it is not restricted to first cousins once removed, as England, Wyse, and Gernet suppose. While it is true that one of the groups entitled to marry an heiress extends to her father's first cousins once removed (925A), we must include the heiress herself within the *ἀγχιστεία*, which will then extend to second cousins. The other group entitled to marry an heiress extends to grandsons of her paternal uncle. In both instances we have a family of four generations derived from a common ancestor. Finally, the deponent at [Demosthenes] 43.37 testifies that his father-in-law is an *ἀνεπιός* to Polemon and that his mother is *ἀνεπιῶ παῖδα* to Polemon. Now if his mother is a second cousin, she will belong to the same generation as his father-in-law, but if she is a first cousin once removed, she will belong to the generation following that of the father-in-law. This would produce an unlikely situation in which the deponent's wife and mother belong to the same generation.

¹⁶) 3.28: *οἱ γε μὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀνεπιῶν φόντες ἀλλήλοις ἀνεπιδοῖ, ἄν τ' ἐκ δύο θηλειῶν ἀνεπιῶν ὄσιν, ἄν τ' ἐκ δύο ἀρρένων, ἄν τ' ἐκ θηλείας τε καὶ ἀρρένος, ἄν τ' αὐτοὶ δύο ἀρρένες ὄσιν, ἄν τε θήλεια καὶ ἀρρην, ὁ μὲν ἀνεπιδοῦς ἢ δ' ἀνεπιδοῦ ἄν δὲ δύο θήλεια, ἄμφω ἀνεπιδοῖ. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀνεπιδοῦν ἀλλήλοις ἐξανέπιό τε καὶ ἐξανέπιαι. Pace Broadbent, op. cit., 124, the *ἀνεπιόι* are not Ego's cousins, but two people who are cousins to one another, as shown by *ἀλλήλοις* and *δύο*.*

¹⁷) Isaios 9.2; Demosthenes 44.26, 57.67, and 57.68 (a sure emendation based on 57.38). This is also the usage of Aristophanes of Byzantium (fr. 10 Nauck) and Hesychios, s.v. *ἀνεπιδοῖ*. At Demosthenes 45.54 *ἀνεπιδοῦς* can

[Demosthenes] 43 uses ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς (and ἀνεψιῶν παῖδες) to mean first cousin(s) once removed¹⁸), but his constant repetition of the term indicates that he is trying to follow the wording of the inheritance law, so that ἀνεψιαδοῦς seems to me the colloquial term for this relationship.

In conclusion, then, ἀνεψιῶν παῖδες is an archaic term meaning second cousins, which has given rise to ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς, meaning second cousin; ἀνεψιαδοῦς probably originally meant first cousin once removed, but the distinction between the two terms was sometimes neglected in everyday speech.

3. ἀνεψιότης

The current explanation of this term may be correct, but some doubt remains. MacDowell¹⁹) cites [Demosthenes] 43.63, where the speaker in paraphrasing the Solonian law on funerals says that it forbids women to enter where the deceased's body lies except relatives μέχρι ἀνεψιότητος. The law, as given in our manuscripts, reads ἐντὸς ἀνεψιαδῶν (62). Thus MacDowell says that ἀνεψιότης extends as far as first cousins once removed but no further. Yet it seems almost incredible to me that a speaker would explain the simple phrase ἐντὸς ἀνεψιαδῶν with a term that occurs only in legal contexts, ἀνεψιότης²⁰). I would suggest, therefore, the possibility that the law, as read aloud during the trial, contained the wording μέχρι ἀνεψιότητος. When we compare the text of Drakon's law on unintentional homicide preserved in this speech (57—58) with the inscribed copy of the law from the late fifth century, we find radical differences in the order of the various provisions and perhaps more significantly some changes in wording, including the following: συνδιώκειν δὲ καὶ ἀνεψιῶν παῖδας καὶ γαμβροὺς καὶ ἀνεψιοὺς καὶ πενθεροὺς καὶ ἀνεψιαδοῦς καὶ φράτορας codd., [συνδιώκ]εν δὲ [κ]ἀνεψ[ι]ότης καὶ ἀνεψιοῦν παῖδας καὶ γαμβροὺς καὶ πενθεροῦς καὶ φρά[τ]ρο[υ]ς.] lapis²¹). It looks as though we have an intrusive gloss in the manu-

mean either first cousins once removed or second cousins, depending of which of the variant readings is correct, ἐκείνης or ἐκείνου. The reading at [Demosthenes] 47.72 is not certain.

¹⁸) 26, 27, 32, 34, 49, 55, 56, and 61.

¹⁹) *Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators*, 18.

²⁰) Twice in Drakon's murder law (for the best text cf. Ronald Stroud, *Drakon's Law on Homicide*) and once in Plato's murder law (*Leges*, 871B).

²¹) This is Stroud's text.

scripts. Likewise at [Demosthenes] 43.62 ἀνεψιαδῶν may be a gloss which has replaced the original word ἀνεψιότητος²³).

Turning to indirect tradition, we find that Hesychios supports the reading of the manuscripts, but Pollux does not. Hesychios' definition ἀνεψιότης· ἢ μέχρι ἀνεψιαδῶν συγγένεια is probably based on his text of [Demosthenes] 43.62—63 and the same reasoning employed by MacDowell. On the other hand, at the end of his discussion of ἀνεψιοί and before that of ἀνεψιαδοῖ Pollux (3.28) has Δημοσθένους δὲ τῆς ἀνεψιότητος εἴρηκε καὶ Σόλων. He must be referring to [Demosthenes] 43.63, but he has failed to make the obvious interpretation which appears in Hesychios. Either he was careless or he did not have the reading which we have in section 62. Perhaps his text had ἀνεψιῶν instead of ἀνεψιαδῶν, as it did at [Demosthenes] 47.72²³), but it may be that he read ἀνεψιότητος here and derived his reference to Solon from this section and not from section 57, as editors assume²⁴). In either case there is some reason for believing that [Demosthenes] 43.62 may be corrupt.

The speaker of [Demosthenes] 47 says that according to Drakon's law on intentional homicide the obligation to pursue the murderer extends to the victim's kin μέχρι ἀνεψιαδῶν (72). Again I suggest that the actual wording of the law was μέχρι ἀνεψιότητος, which is the wording of Plato's ordinance on premeditated murder²⁵) and in Drakon's law on involuntary homicide²⁶). This suggestion supposes no textual error, merely that the speaker is paraphrasing the law. Even if one does not accept this reconstruction of the text of the law, still in this instance it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that the same relatives had the duty of pursuing the murderer in both voluntary and involuntary killings. Thus, if the text is sound, ἀνεψιαδοῖ constitute the outer limit of the ἀνεψιότης. Unfortunately, however, a variant reading at this point in the manuscripts is

²³) *Ex hypothesi* this phenomenon must have occurred twice in this section. In general we may expect that scribes were not especially concerned with the *ipsissima verba* when copying documents or scholia. For another possible instance of ἐντός ousting μέχρι' cf. Stroud, op.cit., 52.

²³) Pollux 8.118.

²⁴) [Demosthenes] 43.57 is a law of Drakon, not of Solon, but we cannot be sure that Pollux was aware of this despite the fact that at 8.42 and 8.125 he distinguishes between the two lawgivers.

²⁵) *Leges* 871 B, with ἐντός instead of μέχρι.

²⁶) Lines 15 and 21 of Stroud's text. In each instance the wording was apparently μέχρι' ἀνεψιότητος καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ.

ἀνεπιῶν, which is also the word which Pollux (8.118) uses in paraphrasing this passage²⁷).

Finally, it seems clear that no definition of *ἀνεπιότης* will prove acceptable unless it enables us to understand the phrase *μέχρι ἀνεπιότητος καὶ ἀνεπιού*, which occurs twice in Drakon's code²⁸). MacDowell's translation, "Relatives within the degree of cousin's son and cousin"²⁹), seems unsatisfactory on two counts. It is hard to see why we have the abstract noun *ἀνεπιότητος* instead of *ἀνεπιαδῶν* to correspond to *ἀνεπιού*, and *ἀνεπιότης* ought to include *ἀνεπιοί* anyway. We ought to take *καί* as something other than the simple copulative³⁰). For instance, it may simply join appositional ideas, giving us an example of archaic pleonasm. If so, *ἀνεπιότης* includes only *ἀνεπιοί*. Or *καί* may join the general and the particular, "the cousinhood and in particular first cousins"³¹). In that case, Drakon would be assigning duties to the *ἀνεπιοί*, and if there are none, then to the other members of the *ἀνεπιότης*. This would accord with his general practice.

The Conditional Nature of *πρίν* Clauses in Attic Prose of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries

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A study of *πρίν* clauses in Attic prose of the fifth and fourth centuries indicates that the descriptions given in the standard grammars are not only not accurate in certain particulars but also needlessly complex. The objective of this paper is to try to simplify the analysis of *πρίν* clauses, to define the clause as a type, to determine certain norms for the use of mood within the clause, and to point out similarities between a *πρίν* clause and other clauses.

²⁷) At [Demosthenes] 43.51 *ἀνεπιαδῶν* has apparently ousted *ἀνεπιῶν*.

²⁸) The word *ἀνεπιού* is not preserved on the stone but is guaranteed by the stoichedon order and the text of [Demosthenes] 43.57.

²⁹) *Op.cit.*, 17, followed by Stroud, *op.cit.*, 6. In reviewing the Budé Demosthenes, J. H. Kells (CR 73, 1959, 119) says that Gernet's "translation 'en deça du degré d'enfant de cousin' glosses over the difficulty."

³⁰) For the uses of *καί* which I suggest cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*², 291.

³¹) In line 14 Drakon apparently uses the singular *ἀδελφός[ς]* for the plural; cf. Stroud, *op.cit.*, 49.